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Abstract 
 
Israeli Organised Crime (IOC) gained prominence in the 1990s for its involvement in the 
manufacturing and wholesale distribution of MDMA through traditional trafficking networks 
across Europe. Equipped with astute business acumen and an entrepreneurial spirit, IOC 
dominated MDMA trafficking in Europe for more than a decade and remains as a major 
participant in this drug market. The paper analyses the entrepreneurial activities of IOC 
within the context of the MDMA market in Europe between 1990 and 2005 using the Crime 
Business Analysis Matrix (CBAM) as proffered by Dean, et al (2010). The study is in two 
parts. Part A provides a review of the literature as it pertains to IOC and its involvement in 
the European drug market, while Part B provides a qualitative analysis of their criminal 
business practices and entrepreneurialism of IOC within this context.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As was the case in many developed nations, organised crime in Israel grew steadily from the 
1960s, initially through familial crime networks conducting traditional ‘mafia’ type activities 
such as illegal casinos, vice and loan sharking, ‘shakedowns’ through violence and 
intimidation and general gang related crime. (Katz, 2005; Rabinovitch, 2010). By the late 
1980s, organized crime in Israel had been given a significant boost thanks to strong cultural 
links with the burgeoning crime networks of the Soviet Union, which was by then going 
through a process of disintegration. 
 
However, it was not until the early 1990s that Israeli Organised Crime (IOC) networks found 
their principal stock-in-trade for the following twenty years and beyond; the synthetic drug 
3,4 methylenedioxymethylamphetamine (MDMA), commonly known as Ecstasy.  IOC 
networks were the first global crime phenomenon to see the many benefits of this drug as an 
illicit commodity; huge profits, its acceptable party image and ease of transportation and use. 
IOC effectively made MDMA their own, using established European black markets and 
crime networks originally devised for diamond smuggling and money laundering (Harpaz 
and Colombo, 2000; Siegel 2009).  As such, extensive IOC networks now exist in Europe and 
the U.S. and are growing in Asia and Australasia.  IOC is mainly, but not exclusively 
engaged in MDMA trafficking on an industrial scale. While synthetic drug trafficking is their 
main activity, they have a noted involvement in sex trafficking and the illegal harvesting and 
sale of human organs over the past twenty years (Meyer, 2006; Chaikin and Safran, 2010). 
 
IOC networks have to date, been effective in maintaining a supply monopoly to the two 
largest MDMA markets, namely the U.S. and Europe (Katz, 2005). However, as criminal 
knowledge about production and trafficking spreads amongst the global criminal diaspora, 
IOC is gradually losing some market share to a range of alternative crime groups, particularly 
in Asia (ACC, 2011). It is posited that these developments are nothing more than the harsh 
reality of global market forces, largely beyond the control of IOC networks. Nonetheless, 
IOC continues to dominate global MDMA trafficking and remain a potent criminal force in 
this sector of the synthetic drug market. 
 
This paper is comprised of two Parts. Part A provides a review of the literature as it relates to 
Israeli Organised Crime (IOC) and its involvement in criminal activities in particular its 
involvement in the European MDMA market. Part B provides an analysis of the 
characteristics of contemporary IOC networks, using the Criminal Business Analysis Matrix 
(CBAM) method designed by Dean, et al. (2010).  
 
The CBAM model assesses IOC networks’ performance and characteristics against five (5) 
entrepreneurial capabilities (Opportunity Perspective, Resources Mobilisation, Decision in 
Uncertainty, People & Cooperation; and Profit Maximization) and four (4) business phases  
(Establishment Phase, Expansion Phase, Consolidation Phase; and the Positioning Phase). 
The four business phases comprise a total of 16 business development factors. Against these 
capabilities, a rating of HIGH, MEDIUM or LOW is assigned, with accompanying 
explanations. A graphical representation of these ratings for both capabilities and business 
development factors can be found at Appendix ‘A’. 
 
Approach 
This study of IOC using the CBAM (Dean, et al. 2010) incorporates a comparative review of 
the literature on several aspects of IOC activity, with a strong focus on those Israeli criminal 
networks based in the Netherlands and Belgium, which remain significant countries for 
MDMA manufacture and wholesale distribution. Data collected against the following themes 
were compared and contrasted and used to complete the CBAM as proffered by Dean, et al 
(2010): 
 
 History and development of IOC 
 The expansion from domestic activity to Transnational status 
 The nexus with, yet distinctions from Russian Organised Crime 
 The advent of MDMA and IOC’s consummate exploitation of this 
 The  various modus operandi of IOC trafficking and money laundering 
 Other organized crime activities engaged in by IOC 
 Growing global recognition of the threat posed by IOC 
 Evidence of change in MDMA market dynamics as new crime actors engage in 
production and distribution, particularly in Asia 
 
This paper illustrates IOC’s consummate ability to identify criminal opportunities, mobilize 
the required resources and maximize profits. However, like most organizations both illegal 
and legitimate, decision making during times of uncertainty remain a challenge.  
 
Limitations of this paper 
The authors acknowledge the dynamic nature of domestic and international drug markets. 
Therefore the data analysed in this paper is limited to the period 1990 to 2005 and is further 
limited by the fact that it is drawn from open sources and scholarly articles and like 
publications.  Descriptive on the activities of IOC is, in the main, focused on its involvement 
in the European MDMA drug market for the stated period under examination.  
 
DISCUSSION 
PART A 
History and development of Israeli Organised Crime (IOC)  
A comparative review of the literature suggests that the term Israeli Organised Crime (IOC) 
entered the justice lexicon sometime in the early 1990s. According to the Israeli National 
Police (INP), Israel had first recognized an organised crime in Israel around 1978 and twenty 
years later it declared the criminal networks as a strategic threat (Rabinovitch, 2010).  
Similarly, Katz (2005) described the evolution of Israel’s organized crime environment since 
the 1960s, noting that a handful of powerful crime families in Israel had traditionally run 
illegal neighborhood casinos, prostitution rings and loan sharking operations. In keeping with 
organized crime in much of the developed world, these activities grew steadily over the 
following years. 
 
Given Israel’s longstanding struggle to achieve localized security both within and at its 
borders it is unsurprising that organized crime networks have readily adopted the methods of 
terrorism to strike at competitive enemies. For example, Mohammad (2008) described the use 
of car bombs to eliminate rivals during a violent dispute between organized crime factions in 
Israel. The gang war was sparked by the murder by car bomb of Yaakov Alperon, the leader 
of a Tel Aviv criminal gang. Mohammad notes the fact that innocent bystanders have been 
injured in crime killings, the battle being over a business operation and the desire for 
vengeance on the part of Alperon's family (Mohammad, 2008 p. 27). 
 
In later work, Mohammad (2009) discussed the visible rise of IOC in Israel, referencing 
publicly visible episodes of violence, specifically in Tel Aviv and the killing of Yaakov 
Alperon. His son, Omer Alperon promised retribution for those who killed his father. At the 
time, the Israeli government flagged its intention to crack down on organized crime in Israel 
(Mohammad 2009, p. 13). 
 
Despite a steady build up in violence, the Jewish nation was somewhat slow in responding to 
the growing threat of organized crime. Adamoli, Di Nicola, Savona and Zoffi (1998) noted 
that in 1997 Israel introduced mutual legal assistance legislation for asset forfeiture 
investigations, while money laundering laws only came into being in 2000 (Shebanova, 
2010). Sangaro (2007 p. 27) observed that it was not until 2003 that Israel passed an anti-
organized crime law and much later, in 2008 that the INP launched a new police unit to 
enforce it. The phenomenon of organised crime was now in the public eye in the form of 
murders and drug trafficking and the Israeli government felt obliged to respond (Sangero, 
2007 p. 66). 
 
The move to Transnational Status 
The growth of IOC domestically appears to have been slow but steady. According to a 2005 
regional security assessment, organised crime in Israel remained fragmented and 
opportunistic, despite the influx of Russian criminals and the subsequent turf wars 
experienced in the 1990s (Jane's Intelligence Review, 2005, p. 32 - 34). This assessment 
appears to have been focused entirely on the domestic outlook concerning IOC within Israel’s 
borders. However, there is clear evidence that from the late 1990s, IOC had expanded to a 
prime European crime base; Amsterdam. It was also utilizing its connections within the 
diamond industry in the nearby Belgian city of Antwerp, to provide informal banking 
facilities for the criminal network (Siegel, 2009).   
 
 
 
 A Complicated Nexus with Russian Organised Crime 
Because of the longstanding close family and migratory links between the former Soviet 
States and Israel, entrenched by the post-war exodus of Jews to the new nation, significant 
linkages and overlaps between criminal networks of both regions can be found. While these 
overlaps need to be acknowledged, it is critical to avoid any equation of commonality 
between the two.  Russian Organised Crime (ROC) presents a much larger global threat 
through its sheer numbers and diversity of operations. The question of delineation between 
IOC and ROC is further blurred by the use of terms such as ‘Jewish organised crime’ by 
some to describe Russian émigré crime networks operating in U.S. cities and elsewhere in the 
world (Glenny 2008). 
 
Williams (1998) observed that throughout the 1990s, criminals from the former Soviet Union 
flooded into Israel, exploiting both the law of return and the lack of anti–money laundering 
measures. In some cases, money from Russia was used in Israel to buy up businesses 
burgeoning on bankruptcy that would then start to make profits which eventually found their 
way back to Russia. In some instances, these transnational criminal organizations also created 
jurisdictional confusion, making it difficult for any single nation’s law enforcement agency to 
act effectively against them (Williams, 1998 p. 71). 
 
Davis, Hirst and Mariani (2001, p. 16) described how post-soviet organised crime has grown 
and extended its operations into foreign countries aided by new travel freedoms afforded to 
Soviet citizens. Granville (2003) refers to Jonathon Wine (the former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Law Enforcement), who claimed: 
 
''There is not a major Russian organised crime figure who we are tracking who does 
not also carry an Israeli passport. An obvious attraction of such a travel document is 
the relationship between Israel and the U.S and limits on extradition laws with 
Russia”. 
 
MDMA 
Above all else, the arrival of the illicit recreational drug MDMA, commonly known as 
Ecstasy on the world stage in the early 1990s had a profound effect on the development and 
growth of IOC (Agar and Schacht Reisinger 2003). According to Katz (2005), drugs only 
became readily available in Israel after the Six-Day War, when contact with Arab-run 
cannabis plantations in Lebanon and Syria occurred, and hashish was suddenly cheap and 
available. From the 1970s, thousands of young tourists visited Israel from colleges in North 
America and Europe. They volunteered on kibbutzim,  gradually introducing curious Israelis 
on to drugs (Katz, 2005, p. 21).  
 
A complementary narrative on Israeli drug use is offered by Amir (2003), who contends that 
the ‘Ecstasy culture’ was imported to Israel in the early 1990s, as a consequence of thousands 
of young Israelis travelling to South America, India and other exotic party locations as an 
escape from the violence and conflict experienced during their military service. Some 
brought drugs back; others became small time dealers while the more ambitious developed 
into importers (Amir 2003, p. 20). MDMA became closely associated with rave/dance culture 
and the party scene (Cohen, 1998). 
 
By 1998 U.S. officials were reporting on the Jewish State as a significant drug-consuming 
country and a trafficking power, with serious marijuana, hashish and heroin use, and a 
growing problem of cocaine, LSD, and amphetamine consumption (Katz 2005 p. 4). 
However, Ecstasy developed as the key commodity of IOC networks, and remains significant 
to their activities to this day. From the 1990s, it was primarily produced in Dutch and Belgian 
labs ranging from industrial-sized plants and mobile labs hidden inside trucks or on floating 
barges, to basements underneath farms and factories (Romano, 2002 p. 36, Katz, 2005, 
Siegel, 2009).   
 
Modus Operandi 
It may be instructive to examine how IOC networks have become so adept at distributing and 
marketing Ecstasy globally.  Israelis have had smuggling networks in place between Israel, 
the Netherlands and Belgium for many years (Harpaz and Colombo, 2000; Siegel, 2009). 
These were used for shipping stolen diamonds through Brussels and Amsterdam to points 
worldwide. When a few drug dealers first encountered MDMA they successfully test-
marketed the drug in Israel, before using existing diamond routes for its wider distribution in 
Europe and beyond (Katz, 2005). 
 
Israel’s then lax banking laws, make it easy to launder the proceeds from this drug trafficking 
activity. But the nature of Israeli society also contributed to the success of this new MDMA 
venture. Katz (2005) noted: 
 
"Israelis are industrious, intelligent, innovative, and they love to travel…They are 
ideally suited for the global drug trade." (Katz, 2005, p. 3).  
 
By the 1990s it appears that IOC had made itself at home in the Netherlands, partly through 
the old connections with the diamond smuggling trade. Punch (1991) explored the nature of 
the Dutch criminal landscape through the biographies of seasoned criminals and found that 
the traditional underworld in the Netherlands has been replaced by organised crime in the 
hands of Israelis and others.  IOC networks had become entrenched in the Dutch MDMA 
landscape, moving beyond their early roles as deal brokers and traffickers, into primary 
production in some instances (Blickman, 2004).  
 
According to Guttman (2004), two classes of criminals can be distinguished among Israelis 
involved in the MDMA scene: the directors of the networks, who have strong connections to 
the Israeli underworld, and the couriers, who are responsible for getting the drugs from 
Europe to the States. The couriers are recruited in Europe or the U.S. in return for the promise 
of big profits and for the most part carry out similar missions many times (Guttman, 2004 p. 
18). 
 
Katz (2005) also noted that the Israelis were the first to see the mass-market potential for 
MDMA. It didn't have to be smoked, snorted or injected, nor did it expose the user to risk of 
HIV infection (Joseph, 2000 p. 23). Yet Israeli dealers were not content only with local 
distribution; working with Dutch and Belgian criminal connections, they were instrumental in 
marketing the drug and creating the demand in Europe and throughout the world (Amir, 
2003). For example, Blickman (2004) recounted how in 1994 an Israeli crime group 
establishing an MDMA laboratory near Amsterdam, coming to police attention when it 
subsequently exploded.  Blickman described another IOC group’s involvement with a seized 
laboratory in the Netherlands in 2001. The laboratory produced 120,000 pills an hour and 
Israelis were violently extorting money in Israel to fund its Dutch operation.  
 
IOC networks have successfully used Western Europe as a hub to distribute MDMA globally, 
primarily from its production centres in the Netherlands and Belgium. Katz (2005, p. 37) 
concluded that: 
 
“… today, Israelis have a virtual monopoly on the global trade of Ecstasy”.  
 
According to Blickman (2004) The U.S. discovered the role of IOC in MDMA trafficking 
around 1995, as seizures at airports pointed to IOC networks in the Netherlands, mainly 
supplied by Dutch producers (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, 2003). By 2004, the U.S Federal Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) publicly made the claim that:  
 
“Israeli and Russian criminal groups control most wholesale MDMA distribution in 
the United States …”.  
 
While at the same time, noting that Asian, South American and Middle Eastern organized 
crime groups also played a role (US Department of Justice -USDEA, 2004, p. 127). The 
significant involvement of IOC in MDMA trafficking continues to the current time, being 
diluted only by the emergence of new global actors in the MDMA trade in the past ten years 
(US Department of Justice -USDEA, 2004, p. 127). 
 
The involvement and capabilities of IOC networks in Western Europe and the U.S. are well 
documented (Europol, 2005). However, the reach of IOC has been increasingly global for the 
past twenty years, with activities being detected in Africa, Southeast Asia, Japan and 
Australasia (US Department of Justice -USDEA, 2004, p. 127; Katz, 2005; ACC, 2011). For 
example, Katz (2005 p. 3) describes how in September 2000, Japanese police arrested a 
major IOC figure for smuggling 25,000 Ecstasy tablets into Japan.  
 
In 2009, further evidence of IOC penetration in Japan came to light when Japanese 
authorities uncovered a suspected drug trafficking and money laundering ring believed to be 
run primarily through Israeli-run jewelry kiosks in Tokyo (Lis, 2009). Authorities believe the 
international ring was headed by an Israeli living in Estonia. Police believe a great deal of the 
money was also laundered in Israel, as well as through real estate purchased abroad. One of 
the key Israeli criminals arrested was considered a prominent figure in Tokyo nightlife (Lis 
2009, p. 1). 
 
IOC has used both shipment and couriers to distribute MDMA globally. Packaged MDMA is 
sent overseas through parcel post, with IOC dispatchers drive through Holland, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg to post their packages or deliver locally in person.  IOC networks have mainly 
used Israelis as mules, or couriers, to bring the drug into the United States.  Israeli nationals 
living in Europe and the United States, typically young and seeking some easy cash, made 
ideal couriers, with organizers overseeing several couriers on flights from Europe. (Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, 2002) IOC networks have also used orthodox and Hasidic 
Jews from the New York area to smuggle MDMA into New York's major airports in 1999 
and 2000 (Lefer, 2001, p. 1).  
 
IOC networks have, by necessity become adept at financing deals and money laundering the 
subsequent proceeds. The entrepreneurial nature of Israelis was also highlighted by Spapens 
(2010) who notes that within the Israeli criminal diaspora, there are sophisticated informal 
systems for fund raising for both licit and illicit undertakings. Sometimes the people who 
raised the money will not even know precisely what the capital is being used for.   
 
In a field study, Van Duyne (1995) observed that money exchange offices in Amsterdam 
appeared to play an important role in the financial management of IOC money laundering. 
Cash is changed into other currencies and easier money-carriers at the exchanges. Van 
Duyne’s analysis of four `bureaux de change' operated by an Israeli family in Amsterdam 
revealed a turnover of hundreds of millions of guilders per year.   
 
Maintaining profits in a crowded market 
 
Profit margins from MDMA production and trafficking are so enormous that organized crime 
groups from other countries are now entering the market (Katz, 2005, Rabinovitch, 2010). 
Some loss of market dominance by IOC is an unavoidable market consequence, as 
knowledge of MDMA production methods becomes common within transnational and local 
crime groups. For example, by 2011 the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) noted that 
some of the crime groups identified as involved in the trafficking and distribution of MDMA 
in Australia include Italian and Israeli crime groups (ACC 2011, p. 60). Increasingly, MDMA 
is sourced from Southeast Asia (ACC 2011, p. 60; Schloenhardt 2007, p. 64).  
 While MDMA remains a popular drug today, market forces have led to fluctuations in its 
fortunes. Klerks (2000) examined the Dutch criminal environment and MDMA market at the 
turn of the new millennium and observed that competition from the former Soviet countries 
and Israeli traffickers was stronger than ever, risking a collapse in the local MDMA market. 
For Dutch and Israeli drug entrepreneurs alike, this resulted in a concentrated effort to 
develop export markets. In an indication of market saturation, Holland in the year 2000 
witnessed an unprecedented number of assassinations among criminals, a phenomenon which 
observers attribute at least partly to drug deals gone wrong and infighting among major 
ecstasy producers (Klerks, 2000 p. 14).  
 
The Amsterdam police force interviewed in excess of a hundred criminal contacts in late 
2000, in relation to the assassinations, and found many of them to be fearful for their lives 
and insecure about their business (Klerks, 2000 p. 15). IOC networks did not flinch at this 
increased level of police attention and have proved resilient in the face of market pressures 
and competition from new market entrants. For example, when a decline in consumption in 
Holland led to further fears of local market saturation the Israelis responded to this challenge, 
by penetrating the U.S. market still further, while establishing footholds in Australia and 
Japan (Katz 2005, ACC 2011, p. 60).   
 
Brunt, Poortman, Niesinki, and Van den Brink (2010) observed that the market of illicit drugs 
can be considered just as dynamic as that for legal products. New synthetic drugs, known as 
designer drugs, are continuously appearing on the illicit drug market (Jerrard, 1990, Wodak, 
2008). Brunt et al. (2010) demonstrated the instability of the MDMA market in the 
Netherlands, showing a decrease of tablet production by more than 50% in 2009. In addition, 
they describe a partial replacement of MDMA in tablets sold as ecstasy by a previously 
unseen substance, mephedrone (or 4-methylmethcathinone). Known intelligence on the 
characteristics of IOC however, suggests that they will easily adapt and evolve to any such 
changes in the synthetic drug market (Rabinovitch, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 PART B 
CASE STUDY ANALYSIS - IOC MDMA  
Crime Business Analysis Matrix (CBAM) Dean et al (2010) 
PHASE 1: Establishment: 
Opportunity Perspective (Overall Rating: HIGH) 
Entrepreneurial Vision: HIGH 
In a global sense, the term Israeli Organised Crime (IOC) developed as criminological 
descriptive in the mid-1990s in line with growing awareness of the threat posed by this 
phenomenon. However, domestically, organized crime had been identified by Israeli 
authorities as a growing threat from the late 1970s as violence and other publicly obvious 
traits of its presence increased within Israeli society (Katz, 2005).  However, it was not until 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union that IOC came to be recognized as a ‘strategic threat’ 
(Rabinovitch, 2010). 
 
IOC’s genesis was helped by slowness of the Israeli State to develop countermeasures. 
Opportunities were taken to expand crime racketeering in Israel during the 1970-80s, 
unfettered by a distracted justice system. It can be argued that the Jewish nation was 
preoccupied with its immediate security environment and terrorist threats in the post war 
period. For example, Amir (1998) observed that Israeli academics only started to study 
organized crime in the 1970s and intelligence practitioners, even later.  
 
History suggests that IOC demonstrated an extremely high level of entrepreneurial vision in 
realizing the potential of MDMA. Katz (2005) noted that the Israelis were the first to see the 
potential for MDMA in terms of its ‘low risk’ image.. IOC took the MDMA opportunity and 
ran with it. Katz (2005) recounts that when a few Israeli drug dealers first encountered 
MDMA they successfully test-marketed the drug in Israel, before quickly using existing 
diamond routes for its distribution (Katz, 2005, p. 4). However, beyond initial local 
distribution in Israel, IOC began working with Dutch and Belgian criminal connections, as 
they had global ambitions in marketing the drug (Guttman, 2004).   
 
 
 Business Planning: HIGH  
Limited intelligence exists in the public domain about business planning activities of IOC, yet 
the results of their endeavours speak towards careful planning and risk assessment (Lis, 
2009). Success in the domination of the two largest MDMA markets (Europe and the U.S.) 
has not come about by chance, but through incremental planning (Haskew, 2001). 
 
Crime Money Management: HIGH 
IOC networks seek out legitimate means for managing the conversion of crime proceeds from 
illicit to licit. The natural entrepreneurial nature of Israelis also flows through to the 
characteristics of IOC networks, a tendency for self-employment and the conduct of business 
activity being ideal cover for the laundering of crime proceeds. For example, Van Duyne’s 
(1995) analysis of four `bureaux de change' operated by an Israeli family in Amsterdam 
revealed a turnover of hundreds of millions of guilders per year.   
 
A similar crime money management model came to light amongst Israeli criminals operating 
in Japan in 2009, when Japanese authorities uncovered a suspected drug trafficking and 
money laundering ring run through Israeli-run jewelry kiosks in Tokyo. The money was also 
laundered in Israel and through real estate purchased abroad (Lis, 2009 p. 1). 
 
Resource Mobilisation (Overall Rating: HIGH) 
Financial Capital: HIGH 
Israelis are widely acknowledged for their entrepreneurial skills in raising startup funds for 
business ventures in the licit world. Accordingly, IOC networks have, by necessity used these 
skills in financing deals and money laundering the subsequent proceeds. For the average 
MDMA venture, the bulk of advanced funds are required to pay the typically Dutch or 
Belgian manufacturer. The next tranche of funds is required for transportation, short or long 
haul, depending on destination. Upon the split-up of shipment to wholesalers and dealers, 
funds start to be re-couped, bringing the ultimate ‘payday’. Sophisticated informal payment 
systems exist within the Israeli criminal Diaspora. This informal banking system has many 
advantages; it is a ‘closed shop’ with exclusive membership, it attracts no formal paperwork 
or transactional trail which can be followed by law enforcement and it is an instant, liquid 
means of cash or asset transfer (Spapens, 2010). 
 Operational Logistics: HIGH 
With the advent of MDMA, IOC had a head-start with logistical networks, through 
established smuggling networks between Israel, the Netherlands and Belgium (Harpaz and 
Colombo 2000, Siegel 2009). IOC uses both shipping and couriers to distribute MDMA 
globally (Amir, 2003). Packaged MDMA is sent overseas through parcel post, IOC 
dispatchers driving through Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg to ship their packages to a 
range of European and global destinations.   
 
Human Resources: LOW 
In the area of personal couriers, IOC networks have mainly used Israelis as ‘mules’ to bring 
the drug into the United States. Israeli nationals living in Europe and the United States, being 
young and eager to travel and earn money, are perfect candidates for this role. IOC networks 
have also used orthodox and Hasidic Jews from the New York area to smuggle MDMA into 
New York's major airports. (Lefer, 2001)  
 
In terms of human capital, Israelis bring some special qualifications to the table. Israel’s 
ongoing security environment means that several generations of Israelis have, by way of 
compulsory military service, developed the skills to survive conflict and adversity and 
problem-solve to achieve desired outcomes (Amir, 2003). Military training will bring for 
many an eye for detail and vigilance in relation to immediate or potential threat, be it from 
police or criminal.  
 
IOC’s preference for using young, party-seeking travelers of Israeli or at least Jewish origin 
provides at once a potential strength and weakness for this crime group. By only using human 
resources of their own culture, religion and background, IOC networks are insuring against 
‘rogue’ operatives. IOC benefits from this through preconceptions and attitudes formed from 
a siege mentality (resulting from Israel’s ongoing security environment). These factors 
encourage a collectiveness and consistency of behaviour amongst couriers.  However, this 
almost exclusive use of Jewish personnel for global trafficking can also serve to make the 
parameters of IOC networks highly visible to law enforcement (US Customs Service et al. 
2000). The Israeli accent, first and family names are highly distinctive and not easily 
disguised.  These factors are perhaps IOC’s greatest vulnerability and give law enforcement a 
starting point when seeking out IOC drug networks for investigation (US Customs Service et 
al. 2000). 
PHASE 2:  Expanding Implementation 
Decision Making in Uncertainty (Overall Rating: MEDIUM)  
In the mid 1990s, Israeli drug criminals were faced with a dilemma; whether to invest heavily 
in the then new synthetic ‘tablet’ drug scene in a gamble that it would accelerate in popularity 
past that of say, heroin or cocaine or early forms of methamphetamine. Their decision to 
specialize in MDMA has been broadly vindicated in an entrepreneurial sense. 
 
Business Intelligence: HIGH 
Using conventional business planning and intelligence skills, IOC evaluated this risk, 
ultimately forming the view that prospective gains could be confidently predicted (Amir, 
2003).  IOC networks took a risk on the popularity of MDMA, based on logic regarding the 
convenience and marketed ‘safety’ of the drug. As a result, they were, relatively speaking, 
first into the field. As a result, IOC had no real large-scale competitors for the first fifteen 
years of MDMA trafficking (also being the last fifteen years of the old Millennium). 
  
Violence: LOW 
Israelis are largely a product of their own security environment. As a nation they have faced 
adversity, conflict, violence and the threat of an uncertain security environment for many 
years. A natural corollary of this environmental conditioning is that violence becomes a 
transactional commodity for some.  Heightened or extreme levels of vigilance, paranoia, the 
direct witnessing of violence and military conflict through compulsory military service may 
all play some role in de-sensitization to the use of violence in Israel (Landau, 1988). 
 
The tools of this struggle with terrorism have been used in organized crime disputes, the use 
of bombs to eliminate rivals in Israel now being commonplace (Mohammad, 2008). Innocent 
bystanders have been injured in such crime killings (Mohammad 2009, p. 13).  In 2005 an 
Israeli National Police Superintendent commented publicly on this violence in Israel, 
observing that virtually all IOC members are retired army officers, well trained and heavily 
armed (Eshed, 2005 p. 1). 
 
 By marked contrast there are few indicators of Israeli MDMA networks using violence in the 
wider global MDMA markets. This is likely to be part of a deliberate low-profile strategy as 
outlined by Dean et al. (2010 p. 116) to maintain business advantage. Outside of Israel and 
some limited Jewish-American crime skirmishes in the U.S. IOC networks avoid such violent 
practices. They market their commodity in the relaxed people friendly environment of dance 
parties, rave events, and holiday environments that provide convenient cover to their 
activities (Amir, 2003). 
 
Corruption: LOW 
While political corruption in Israel is endemic, there are no overt indications that IOC has any 
great dependence or reliance on corrupt relationships with authorities or governments to 
facilitate its activities. That is not to say that corrupt relationships do not exist between major 
criminals and politicians. Outside of Israel, there is no clear evidence that IOC networks rely 
upon corrupt practices and relationships any more or less that other known organized crime 
phenomena. However, this observation is qualified by the fact that not enough detail is 
known about IOC network operations outside Israel and North America, beyond periodic 
media reports on syndicate arrests.   
 
Counter-intelligence: HIGH 
Having been the foundation specialists in the MDMA market, IOC is deeply versed in the 
idiosyncrasies of their product, where and how the threats of law enforcement action will 
present and the detection of any signs of serious competition. The military background and 
training of many of its members lends itself to a culture of vigilance and response to threat, 
often in the form of disinformation for the benefit of law enforcement and competitors alike 
(Amir, 2003). 
PHASE 3: Consolidating 
People Co-operation (Overall Rating: HIGH) 
Crime Business Connections: HIGH 
Having strong cultural and business links to the U.S. undoubtedly aids IOC’s crime business 
connections. The Israeli ‘Mafia’  had operated in the United States since the late 1970's and 
has established a significant presence in drug trafficking and various forms of fraud and 
money-laundering (Abramovsky, 1995). Given the close relationship between the U.S. and 
Israel and the size of illicit markets for recreational drugs in the former, this strong 
connection at macro and micro level with the U.S. is assessed as perhaps IOC’s most 
powerful crime business connection. Similarly, crime connections with the former Soviet 
Union are equally useful.  
 
Criminological research conducted in Israel in the last three decades pointed clearly at the 
existence of correlation between crime and ethnic origin as related also to immigration. For 
example, Rattner (1997) studied the possible relationship between ethnicity, immigration and 
crime, examining the involvement of Jewish Russian immigrants in crime to establish 
whether crime is imported or developed after immigration. Rattner (1997) found that both 
theories have support and that crime connections between Israel and Russia and its former 
States are utilised to the fullest. Israeli and Russian criminals have become mutually entwined 
to enhance market penetration and to gain personal protection from law enforcement (Davis, 
Hirst and Mariani, 2001; Granville, 2003) 
 
Legitimate Business Connections: HIGH 
Of the publicized arrests of major IOC leadership figures in Israel, Europe and the U.S. for 
MDMA trafficking over the past twenty years, several have been high-profile figures in the 
nightclub/entertainment industry, conducting ostensibly legitimate businesses in this realm 
(Lis, 2001 p. 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Influential People Connections: MEDIUM  
In the U.S. in particular, some of the more successful IOC figures adopted a higher public 
profile through business activities. By 1999, the U.S authorities determined that one Israeli, 
Oded Tuito, was responsible for about 80 percent of the entire ecstasy supply in the United 
States and targeted him accordingly (Sweetingham, 2009). Tuito, who had built a substantial 
business empire, died while under investigation by the US- DEA. Despite this, there are no 
overt indications that IOC benefits from patronage of any corrupt political relationships or 
major public figures of influence. 
 
PHASE 4: Positioning  
Profit Maximisation (Overall Rating: HIGH)  
 
Local Market Share: HIGH 
MDMA as a drug phenomenon was imported to Israel in the mid 1990s, influenced by an 
already strong Ecstasy culture in Britain, Germany and Spain (Amir, 2003 p. 20). Israeli 
criminals naturally embraced it as a new money making opportunity.  MDMA became 
entrenched in the party scene amongst those in Israeli society with time and expendable 
income for recreational drugs. For various reasons, IOC struggled to produce the drug 
domestically within Israel and maintained a reliance on Dutch and Belgian primary 
producers, yet the drug has become intensely popular in the Jewish State (Amir, 2003). 
   
Global Market Share: HIGH  
IOC networks have successfully used Western Europe as a hub to distribute MDMA globally 
from its production centres in the Netherlands and Belgium. (US Department of Justice -
USDEA, 2004, p. 127).  U.S. Customs data that showed that during the time period between 
October 1999 and April 2000 it seized four million Ecstasy tablets, up from the 750,000 
tablets it found in fiscal year 1998. (Haskew, 2001 p. 1) 
 
Despite these early indicators, the U.S. only formally acknowledged the role of IOC in 
MDMA trafficking around 1995 as MDMA seizures continues to rise (Blickman, 2004). U.S. 
federal law enforcement seizure analysis showed that the amount of MDMA smuggled into 
the United States had greatly increased through the 1990's (US Customs Service et al., 2000; 
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2003). By the mid-2000’s it 
was argued that IOC had a virtual monopoly on the global trade of Ecstasy (Katz, 2005). 
 
By 2004, the U.S Federal Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
publicly claimed that: “Israeli and Russian criminal groups control most wholesale MDMA 
distribution in the United States”, while noting that Asian, South American and Middle 
Eastern organized crime groups also played a role. (Microgram Bulletin, 2004, p. 127).  IOC 
networks have also steadily increased their operating base in Australia. According to the 
Australian Crime Commission (ACC)  2011 illicit drug report, some of the crime groups 
identified as involved in the trafficking and distribution of MDMA in Australia included 
‘Italian and Israeli crime groups’ (ACC 2011, p. 60).   
 
The market of illicit drugs can be considered just as dynamic as that for legal products. 
(Brunt, Poortman, Niesinki and Van den Brink, 2010). Market forces for MDMA such as 
competitiveness, fluctuations in demand and commercial intelligence ‘leaks’ have seen some 
weakening of the IOC position in the MDMA market over time. Profit margins from MDMA 
are so enormous that organized crime groups from other countries were entering the MDMA 
market as early as ten years ago (Katz, 2005).  
 
Some loss of market dominance by IOC is an unavoidable market phenomenon, as MDMA 
production methods become more commonly known in transnational and local crime groups 
around the world. As early as 2000 a joint U.S. federal law enforcement report predicted that 
the future should expect to see a small number of MDMA laboratories becoming established 
in Mexico and Mexican Cartels are becoming more involved in MDMA trafficking (US 
Customs Service et al. 2000).  
 
This dilution of the manufacturing monopoly continued over the following decade. Changes 
in market share in recent years are possibly linked to MDMA having reached something of a 
zenith in popularity between 1998-2002. For example, Brunt et al. (2010) demonstrated the 
instability of the MDMA market in the Netherlands towards the end of the last decade, 
showing a decrease of tablet production by more than 50% in 2009.  According to the ACC, 
in 2006, the volume of global MDMA seizures were 37 percent less than in the peak year of 
2002.  
 
This may reflect declining production rates in European centres. In the United States there 
were also indications of declining rates of use and availability of MDMA in recent years, 
contrasting with the strong rise in seizures in Oceania and East and South East Asia (ACC, 
2006 p. 4). 
 
In 2005 law enforcement was still reporting that the majority of the world’s MDMA 
continued to be produced in Western Europe, but in recent years seizures have indicated that 
locally produced MDMA was available in Australia (ACC, 2006 p. 8).  By 2011, it was 
increasingly clear that MDMA was sourced by developed markets such as Australia from 
Southeast Asia (ACC 2011, p. 60; Schloenhardt 2007, p. 64), with a growing emphasis on 
China as a source. 
 
New synthetic drugs, known as designer drugs, are continuously appearing on the illicit drug 
market (Jerrard, 1990; Wodak, 2008). Some of these drugs continue to be loosely marketed 
as ‘Ecstasy’. Brunt et al. (2010) describe a partial replacement of MDMA in tablets sold as 
ecstasy by a previously unseen substance, mephedrone (or 4-methylmethcathinone). A further 
complication for IOC is the ‘blurring’ of the MDMA market in many countries. In Australia 
it is acknowledged that recreational drug tablets marketed and sold as ‘Ecstasy’ may contain 
no MDMA at all, but may be an amalgam of other synthetic chemicals and substances (ACC, 
2006). 
  
Competitive Advantages: HIGH 
Against this backdrop of lower quality recreational drugs sold as ‘Ecstasy’, IOC networks 
have the important competitive advantage of being strongly associated with the original high 
quality version of MDMA, as was widely available from Holland around the beginning of the 
Millennium. IOC maintains strong capabilities in providing high quality MDMA, tempered 
only by manufacturing constraints and market competition. 
 
Other competitive advantages enjoyed by IOC networks include strong cultural and familial 
links to a wider entrepreneurial Jewish community in many centres of the world. However, 
for the purposes of MDMA trafficking, these contacts are intensively used in the cities of 
Antwerp, Amsterdam, New York and Tel-Aviv. The Jewish (and thus Israeli) connection 
with Russian Organised Crime and more mainstream Jewish-American crime strengthens 
IOC’s advantage through sheer numbers, greater options regarding the finance of crime and 
access to more markets.  That the majorities of IOC’s member base of drug and cash couriers 
are enmeshed in global travel as backpackers, the nightclub scene and rave events, presents 
an additional competitive advantage through access to a ready-made markets for recreational 
drugs. 
 
A diagrammatical representation of the collective capabilities of IOC within the context of 
the MDMA industry across all four phases can be seen below as Appendix A: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Conclusion  
IOC has been industrious in pursing the criminal opportunities afforded to them, growing 
their MDMA enterprise into an unprecedented global operation. IOC networks were in the 
right place at the right time to exploit the arrival and popularity of MDMA amongst the 
affluent markets of Europe and the U.S. However, this in no way detracts from the high-level 
organization and efficiency demonstrated by IOC in building an empire based on MDMA.  
 
Despite the likelihood of changes in the future market dynamics of MDMA and its 
derivatives, law enforcement can confidently predict that IOC will reform and adapt as 
necessary to ensure that they remain a global force in recreational drugs. IOC networks are 
resilient, well connected with youth culture and its recreational drug consumerism, ruthless in 
business and determined to maximize profits and maintain market share. IOC will likely 
evolve with ease to take entrepreneurial advantage of any future opportunities in the synthetic 
drug market as they emerge. 
 
The earlier comment by one researcher that Israeli criminals are ‘ideally suited’ to the 
MDMA trade is highly pertinent here. This adds to the contention reached during this study 
that whatever changes occur in the future market dynamics of MDMA and its derivatives, 
law enforcement can confidently predict that IOC will reform and adapt as necessary to 
ensure that they remain a global force in organized crime. They are resilient, well connected 
with youth culture and its recreational drug consumerism, ruthless in business and determined 
to maximize profits and are representative of the emerging entrepreneurial criminal 
organization discussed by Dean et al (2010).  
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